A significant component of the long term strategy to counter-piracy originating in Somalia is the attempt to find regional solutions. The idea is to build a regional maritime security infrastructure which can cope with the menace in the long run. The very successful implementation of the East Asian Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP ) which provides a regional structure for cooperation and communication is the role model for such a solution. [1] To build such a structure for the Western Indian Ocean region, the international actors have worked along two tracks. Firstly, attempts have been made to implement such a structure within existing regional organizations, including the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the East African Community (EAC), the South African Development Community (SADC) or the African Union (AU). Several initiatives are underway or in the planning stage within these organizations, the outcome of which is unclear so far. Secondly, since 2009 a process is underway to build such a structure outside of existing organizations. The so called Djibouti Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea areas process (or in short: Djibouti Code or DCoC, ) steered by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has been making slow but steady progress to build such an infrastructure. Implemented as a largely technical structure on an expert level the process has led to some tangible outcomes. The DCoC process is and arguably will be crucial to address piracy in the long run. Yet, so far there is little analysis or debate on it. In this commentary we aim at filling this gap. We review what DCoC has achieved so far, what it wants to achieve, what its main hurdles for progress are and what its future role in the counter-piracy regime might be. In what follows we provide an overview of the process and offer some initial thoughts on the challenges the process faces. Read the rest of this entry »
- [1] For a discussion of ReCAAP see Ho 2009, Geiss & Petrig 2011, Kraska 201. ↩

The international shipping industry has made increasing efforts to raise the public profile of the piracy problem and to lobby for more support. A crucial device has been the campaign “Save our Seafarers” (SOS) launched in March 2011. If we follow the results of the study, then public campaigns such as SOS have not succeeded to convince their publics that piracy is a public concern. They have failed to make a case that piracy is more than an issue of commercial interests and a problem of a handful of corporations (which moreover, have hesitated to contribute as much as they could in tax). If such a case will not be made than it is unlikely that more public resources will be devoted to piracy. Even more worrying for global shipping, it carries the risk that the international naval missions will come to an end or will be significantly downscaled sooner or later. Yet, why has the SOS campaign failed so far to make such a case and win the public? One answer is obviously the lack of resources. Another answer is experience. Over the past decades, global shippers have been more busy to hide the nature of their business from an already “seablinded” public. This widespread culture of secrecy among the shipping industry as well as the exclusivity in the wider community of mariners is a hindrance in reaching out to the public. A third answer, which is the one I want to expand below, is to be found in the message the SOS campaign disseminates. As I will show below, the campaign is badly designed and might even be considered as counter-productive.
The European Union and its Member States play a significant role in this endeavour. Root causes and symptoms of the Somali crisis shall be tackled by making use of the variety of instruments the EU has at its disposal, all interlinked together in what has been called a comprehensive approach. This approach aims to strategically combine political dialogue, humanitarian and developmental aid with efforts to increase security within the country. Security assistance is firstly provided by the training of security forces via the European Training Mission (EUTM) in Uganda and secondly by deterring, preventing and repressing acts of piracy via EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta – the first naval operation ever implemented within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Furthermore, capacities of Somalia as well as its neighbouring states to prosecute and detain pirates ought to be enhanced and strengthened. The “