When confronting the crisis of Somali piracy, the preferred strategy of the international community has been to deploy naval vessels to protect vulnerable ships and deter and disrupt pirate attacks. The refrain that ‘the solution to piracy lies onshore’ is oft-heard, but counter-piracy actors—including the US, the EU, and NATO—have been slow to deepen their engagement with regional authorities and hesitant to expand the military scope of their operations. A significant shift in strategy was thus seen on March 23, 2012, when the Council of the European Union agreed to extend the area of operations for the EU’s counter-piracy mission, Operation Atalanta, to “include Somali coastal territory as well as its territorial and internal waters.” While a more inland focused policy is a welcome development, the EU’s proposed escalation of force risks increasing civilian casualties and local resentment and will have to contend with the unintended consequences of mission creep. This new strategy also comes at the expense of an alternative onshore policy: increased international support for maritime security capacity building programs in Somalia’s pirate-prone areas and the wider region.

Europe’s New Plan

Launched in December 2008, the EU’s Operation Atalanta, which consists of rotating naval vessels and reconnaissance aircrafts from participating states, was originally mandated under the UN Security Council to protect the shipping of the World Food Programme (WFP) and the African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM). The mission has also served to deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy off the Somali coast. The recent addition to Atalanta’s mandate, which was also extended through to December 2014, calls for the targeting of pirate onshore infrastructure, including moored boats, fuel tanks, and communications equipment. While the UN Security Council had previously provided authorization for inland operations, this marks the first time that international naval forces have proposed a plan and policy for strikes against targets inside Somalia. NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, which operates independently from Atalanta, was also extended through 2014, but onshore operations were explicitly ruled out.

Military experts informing the EU’s decision have argued that attacks should be launched by helicopter gunships in order to accurately hit targets while avoiding civilian casualties. While there was no official pronouncement, Germany’s Der Spiegel reports that a strike limit of two kilometers inland was eventually reached after prolonged debate within the Council. The use of both missile strikes and the deployment of ground troops were prohibited by the Council’s decision. The Council’s plan has not received unanimous support, with Germany’s opposition parties offering the most vocal criticisms.

Charting the Wrong Course

Somalia’s coastal communities have been largely supportive of both local and international efforts to curb piracy, but aggressive military action and the prospect of civilian casualties threatens to erode this good will and feed into the counter-narrative that pirates are ‘coast guards’ protecting Somali waters (and now shores) from illegal foreign fishing and waste dumping. Many EU members—such as Spain, Italy, and Greece—have been accused of these acts, but Atalanta’s new mandate does nothing to address this grievance.

As the EU moves towards a more aggressive counter-piracy strategy it also runs the risk of sacrificing its previous commitments. Naval resources are costly and scarce, as Atalanta is already tasked with patrolling 2-million square nautical miles with between four and seven warships and two to three recognisance aircraft, depending on the season. While the operation’s continuing mandate entails protecting and escorting WFP shipments to Somalia, it now appears to be stretched too thin to accomplish this. Chartered vessels delivering WFP aid have recently had to hire private security teams for protection, causing delays when the legality of the teams needs to be questioned at stops in ports such as Djibouti.

Blowback and Mission Creep

Though Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo assured skeptics that “much care” will be taken to avoid civilian casualties, history teaches that even the best intentioned interventions in Somalia tend to go awry. Pirate bases are not the sprawling “lairs” that the media often paints them to be. In reality, they are temporary and mobile camps made up of little more than a few tents, vehicles, and moored boats. Heavy weapons, ladders and other boarding equipment are some of the only things differentiating fishermen from pirates, but these distinctions cannot always be identified though aerial survaillance. Given the visual similarity between the two groups, experts from Germany’s foreign intelligence agency warned that the EU’s new strategy runs the risk of misidentification and civilian deaths.

Coalition naval forces mistaking fishermen for pirates has already resulted in several deaths at sea. At least eight Somali fishermen are still missing from vessels that were allegedly attacked by foreign warships in mid February. Fishermen operating close to Mogadishu exclaimed that their “jobs are in jeopardy,” telling Somalia Report that they fear attacks by coalition warships. On February 15, Italian marines protecting a cargo vessel shot dead two Indian fishermen they believed to be pirates off the coast of southern India, sparking a diplomatic incident between the two countries. On March 12, two Somali fishermen were killed after an unknown naval vessel (later reported to be a US Navy ship) opened fire on their boat. While the EU’s inland strategy has received a great deal of press coverage, this incident is yet to be picked up by the international media, nor has a statement been made by the US or any other naval coalition member.

Critics of the new mandate have warned that even with the most careful of targeting, Atalanta’s planned onshore operations escalate the risk of EU forces stumbling into “a high intensity conflict” with armed gangs in Somalia. This threat is heightened by the fact that many pirate gangs have moved south and are now operating out of areas controlled by the Islamist militia al-Shabaab. Somalia’s pirates have proved themselves very adaptive, and it is likely that they would move their bases further inland into civilian areas in order to complicate the EU’s efforts to target them. Though ground troops have been excluded from Atalanta’s expansion, soldiers may still need to go ashore in the event of a helicopter being shot down or malfunctioning. The results of the infamous 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident should serve as a sobering reminder of the unintended consequences of mission creep.

Is There a Better Way?

Members of the Council of the European Union are correct in recognizing that piracy at sea cannot be separated from its bases on land, but their approach to tackling this issue is misguided. As this author has previously argued, a lasting solution to the piracy problem requires the international community to begin shifting resources away from a military-centric strategy and towards a program for regional maritime security capacity building. In particular, the EU, NATO and other counter-piracy actors must deepen their engagement with, and support for, authorities in Somalia’s pirate prone areas, primarily the autonomous states of Puntland and Galmudug.

With little international assistance, the newly created Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) has cleared pirate gangs from their stronghold in Eyl and a number of other coastal towns. Local understanding and intelligence has reportedly endeared the PMPF, who also engage in fisheries protection and humanitarian assistance, to the communities in which they operate. While they have had their successes, the PMPF lacks the resources to confront the pirate gangs across the wide expanse of the region’s coast. Puntland’s annual state budget was a reported $20-million in 2010, while the pirates took in an estimated $160-million in ransoms.

A similar problem exists in neighbouring Galmudug, where authorities have expressed plans to launch operations in the pirate hub of Hobyo, but lament that “there are no international organizations sponsoring us.”

There are numerous ways that the international community can support local counter-piracy initiatives. Coastal infrastructure such as roads, docks, and radar stations need to be developed, while maritime police forces require training, vessels, and (most importantly) paychecks.  Investing in maritime security capacity building for Somalia’s sub-state regions does not sound as sexy as ‘bombarding pirate lairs,’ but it remains the best way forward for a long-term strategy.

The Author

James Marcus Bridger serves as a Content Editor and Senior Research Analyst with the Atlantic Council of Canada as part of the Department of National Defence’s Security and Defence Forum Program. He holds a MA in Political Science from the University of Toronto, where he specialized in International Relations. James’ current research focuses on issues of African and maritime security. Building from his initial fascination with Somali piracy, James has expanded his scope to address such issues as: the evolution of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, foreign intervention in Somalia, transnational insurgent groups in the Sahel, and the role of private military companies in African peacebuilding. When trying to clear his mind of pirates, terrorists and militants, James escapes to cycling, travelling and leisure sports.

Conflict ridden and failing states like Somalia as well as the scourge of piracy emanating from its coasts are textbook examples for the truism that dealing effectively with today’s transnational threats demands strong international cooperation and a functioning multi-level governance in the field of security. While the political process on tackling the intractable Somali crisis has been staggering over years, the increasing attacks on merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden, the Somali Basin and the wider Indian Ocean have resulted in unprecedented activities of a multitude of international actors in the maritime sphere and beyond.

The European Union and its Member States play a significant role in this endeavour. Root causes and symptoms of the Somali crisis shall be tackled by making use of the variety of instruments the EU has at its disposal, all interlinked together in what has been called a comprehensive approach. This approach aims to strategically combine political dialogue, humanitarian and developmental aid with efforts to increase security within the country. Security assistance is firstly provided by the training of security forces via the European Training Mission (EUTM) in Uganda and secondly by deterring, preventing and repressing acts of piracy via EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta – the first naval operation ever implemented within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Furthermore, capacities of Somalia as well as its neighbouring states to prosecute and detain pirates ought to be enhanced and strengthened. The “Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa”, adopted by the Council in November 2011 as well as the appointment of a Special Representative for the Horn of Africa is furthermore to interlink the engagement in Somalia with the EU’s policies in the region.

Despite all these efforts and despite close cooperation with many partners such as the United Nations, the African Union, and the United States, the Somali crisis is however not even close to being solved. Somali pirates continue to pose a risk to global maritime shipping. It is also more than doubtful whether – after more than a dozen similar events – the London Conference on Somalia that took place on February 23^rd will be a significant game changer in this regard.

Reviewing the EU’s approach

Based on this account, a newly released study, commissioned by the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament and written by Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Kerstin Petretto from the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg aims to provide an in depth assessment of the EU policies towards Somalia in general and piracy in particular and to identify opportunities, challenges and limitations of tackling such a complex crisis. As such a compilation and critical evaluation of the diverse areas of EU engagement does not exist so far, the study wants to contribute to a better understanding of the EU’s activities in and off Somalia as well as to find ways to improve the response towards the Somali challenge.

The authors based their research on three questions: Firstly, is there such a thing as a comprehensive approach towards Somalia – not only in terms of an overarching strategy but also in terms of interlinking all the actions of the diverse actors within the European Union as well as those actions of its main international partners and those within Somalia. Secondly, what are the effects of the ongoing activities and can they really live up to the self-set aims of the European Union – particularly when taking into consideration that the EU is the main donor for Somalia with regard to humanitarian and development aid and, specifically via EUNAVFOR Atalanta, is also in the front lines of the fight against maritime piracy. And thirdly, to what extent do these self-set aims of the EU match with expectations and structures onshore: It is common sense by now that the solution to any problem emanating from Somalia such as piracy but also international terrorism and other forms of violence and crime will be found in the sociopolitical sphere. Solving the Somali crisis means effectively dealing with political and social problems, hence means the need for building up a viable and stable “state”. Ownership is a word that is being used a lot in the context of these kind of international state-building efforts. Thus, the study also deals with the question if ownership is really a thread followed thoroughly in the EU’s engagement and if the solutions pursued are really as tailor made as one would expect them to be from an optimistic point of view.

Troubles with the EU’s approach: Improving the EU’s policy

Contrary to the EU’s repeated claims that it is following successfully a truly comprehensive approach with regard to Somalia, the study’s main findings are less positive:

Firstly, despite all documents and speeches published by EU institutions highlighting the comprehensive approach, it is still nascent. Of course, the EU is engaged in a diverse set of issue areas that are all in themselves very important, however, a piecemeal approach is still prevalent. This refers to both the institutional set-up as well as the actual engagement. What is still missing is active internal coordination and an alignment of the diverse activities. Foremost, the EU is still lacking an overall strategy to tackle the Somali challenge. The recently adopted strategic framework for the Horn Region with its specific focus onSomaliaas well as the appointment of a special representative for the region can be considered a right step in this direction. Yet, it can only have an impact if the drafting and implementing of projects in the various areas of engagement are coordinated across the different departments of the Commission as well as the EEAS – and not least: with the Member States, something which so far is not being done to a sufficient degree.

Secondly, the study concludes that too much emphasis has been laid upon military means. By putting a lot of effort into backing up a dysfunctional transition government in the capital via EUTM and support for the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) the EU not only makes itself a party to a yet to be resolved violent conflict. It furthermore neglects one lesson that can be drawn out of the history of the Somali conflict: At whatever stage of the conflict, no conflict party, neither insurgents, nor Somali government soldiers or external actors were able to claim a lasting military victory. Quite the contrary, particularly external military intervention usually led to a worsening of the situation and the current developments on the ground again seems to proof this finding. The same finding applies to the EU efforts to counter piracy: although Atalanta can be applauded for protecting the vessels of the World Food Program and reducing the success rate of pirates, the military mission suffers from deficits of the land based approach of the Union: Efforts to enhance regional and local capacities with regard to prosecution and detention and particularly to go after the organizers of the pirate business are still not showing considerable results as the continued practice of catch and release by EU Naval forces demonstrates.

The third deficit of the EU’s Approach identified in the study is the focus of the EU and its major international partners on propping up a national government that does so far not deliver what it is expected to. Although local forms of governance are increasingly being taken note of, the general approach is still aiming at reconciliation and state-building on the national level, via international conferences initiated and driven by external actors. The concept of ownership seems to be used predominantly as rhetorical component, but not as a firm base of EU’s policies and activities. The study thus concludes, that the EU thus should become more actively engaged with local partners from civil society, the clans and local administrations and thereby strengthen its multi-track approach inSomalia.

However, the authors also point to the fact, that potential success of the engagement of external actors in other countries’ crisis is always limited: coherent politics and approaches are only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for effective external security governance and for engagement with and in so-called failing or failed states like Somalia: even if the EU had a perfect comprehensive approach, this would not guarantee success given the manifold local, regional and international intricacies of the Somalia issue. Nonetheless, improving its own strategies and mechanisms of engagement could raise the odds for a more stable Somalia in a more stable region.

It is furthermore common sense that, because it is primarily rooted in Somalia’s political and socio-economic conditions, the solution for the piracy challenge is to be found on land. Therefore the EU should follow an explicit “Somalia first” approach – in contrast to a possible “piracy first” point of departure – whereby the lead has to be in the hands of the Somali people themselves. In this regard, the EU should critically assess the practices and outcomes of its previous state-building efforts and use the insights gained from this for future sound strategy-building. It should consider supporting alternative approaches to centralized forms of governance and de-facto trusteeships such as decentralized systems of governance or non-state oligopolies of power if this better suits local power relations – because, in the end, it is up to the Somali people themselves to decide on the form of governance they wish to establish.

The study can be downloaded at http://www.greens-efa.eu/the-eu-and-somalia-5416.html

For further inquiries the authors can be contacted directly:

Dr Hans-Georg Ehrhart – ehrhart@ifsh.de

Kerstin Petretto – petretto@ifsh.de

Pakistan is one of the frontier countries in the fight against piracy. Piracy incidents have come closer and closer to the coast of Pakistan. The Pakistani navy is the only regional navy which has taken a lead role in the international missions in the Gulf of Aden in commanding the Combined Task Forces 151 twice. Moreover, Pakistani citizens have increasingly become victims of piracy. This includes seafarers as well as fishermen. An international conference held in February 2012 in Karachi took up the challenge to reflect on the importance of Pakistan in counter-piracy and to develop ideas for how counter-piracy can be improved on a national as well as international level.

The three day conference under the theme of “The Human Face of Marine Piracy. Consequences & Policy Options” focused on the question of how the victims of piracy can be better assisted and which policies need to be developed. The conference which was attended by a wide range of Pakistani and international stakeholders was organized by two leading Pakistani institutions in the field of human rights, the Fazaldad Human Rights Institute, and maritime policy, Bahria University’s National Centre for Maritime Policy Research, together with two international partners (Dalhousie University, Canada, and the National Defence University, USA).

The human face of piracy: The MV Suez and the Al Imran

How intricate the humanitarian challenges of piracy are, is best highlighted by two recent piracy cases involving Pakistani nationals, the case of the MV Suez and of the fishing vessel Al Imram.

The MV Suez, an Egyptian owned bulk carrier transporting coal, was attacked by pirates on August 2^nd 2010 while waiting within the International Recommended Transit Corridor to join a convoy. Under heavy fire from automatic weapons the crew managed to defend themselves for about an hour and then surrendered to the pirates. The ship was taken to the Somali coast near Grath. When the pirates formulated the first ransom demands the drama of the MV Suez unfolded, since the owner lacked appropriate insurance and was not willing to pay any ransoms. After eight months of unsuccessful negotiations the crew became increasingly the subject of violence. As reported by the Captain Wasi Hasan, crew members were beaten, stabbed and even shot at. Since the vessel owner showed no sign of paying ransoms, the Captain saw the only possibility in reaching out to his family to work towards his release. The family contacted the Pakistani NGO CPLC which started the ransom negotiations with the pirates. To collect the ransom a public media campaign was launched with Captain Wasi’s daughter 11 year old Laila Wasi as its public face. During the campaign to collect the negotiated ransom of 2.1. million dollar, Wasi’s daughter even announced in television that she will sell her kidney in order to release her father.

The ransom was successfully collected through public donations and the assistance of several welfare trusts. In June 2011, after an 11 month hostage period the crew and the vessel was released. Yet, no further precautions were taken to protect the vessel and the vessel was attacked by pirates again within a few days after its release. The crew, however, successfully managed to defend themselves. Yet, the vessel faced technical difficulties and ran out of fuel. Fortunately the Pakistani navy came to support the vessel. The crew abandoned the MV Suez and was brought to Karachi onboard a Pakistani navy vessel. In Karachi the crew was welcomed by several Pakistani officials. Today, the crew members still suffer from the injuries and the stress of the hostage period.

The case of the Al Imran reveals another piracy caused tragedy. The case received coverage through an article in the German newspaper DIE ZEIT. Its author, Wolfgang Bauer, had a major role in releasing the hostages The Al Imran was a small, 14 meter, fishing vessel from the Pakistani village of Piskhan.

While fishing in the Indian Ocean the vessel was hijacked by pirates in February 2011. Taken to the Somali coast the crew, 11 fishermen, were locked in the vessels storage room of 6 sqm without any sanitary facilities. The pirates demanded a ransom of 300.000 USD from the family of the fishermen. Yet, the families, poor fishermen after all, were unable to come nowhere near such an amount. After an eight month hostage period the Al Imran sank. While the
Both cases reveal the humanitarian tragedies behind contemporary piracy. Cases such as these rarely make the international headlines. Yet, it is exactly in such cases – where vessels do not have insurance, where no professional kidnap and ransom team is ready to handle the issue and no company provides assistance to the traumatized crew members and income to their families during a hostage period and after – where more support is needed and better policies are required. The case of the MV Suez and the Al Imran are not isolated incidents, they happen on a frequent basis. Compared to the unknown sailors and fishermen which have become victims of piracy, the sailors of the MV Suez and the fishermen of the Al Imran, despite all their suffering, were fortunate: they received assistance and their cases where covered by the media. Yet, their histories provides a major lesson, that more assistance is required for those seamen who slip beyond the grid of the professionalized, insurance run kidnap and ransom business of contemporary Somali piracy. Seafarers left without assistance, families left without income. crew members were rescued by the pirates, having no further use for them, they were taken to the Somali coast and left abandoned. Left on a largely uninhabited coast strip, the crew only survived because local Somali fisherman assisted them with rice and water. After a month one of the local Somali travelled to Adado to call the local administration for assistance, The Pakistani fishermen were picked up and brought to the city. Arriving in Adado the odyssey of the Al Imran crew was not over yet. The local administration lacked the means to bring the Pakistani’s to Nairobi, where the nearest Pakistani embassy is located. It was only after they received support from the German journalist, that it became possible to arrange travel first to Nairobi and then further back to Karachi. In contrast to the crew of the MV Suez, however, the crew of the Al Imran did not receive a warm welcome, but had to go to administrative procedures, including a time spend in a Karachi jail, before they finally were released and could travel back to their families.

Addressing the Humanitarian Challenge

The 2012 Karachi Conference took up the challenge to develop better responses to the humanitarian challenge of contemporary piracy. The organizing institutes were very successful in bringing together different representatives of organizations which have a major role in counter piracy. This included a representative from the CPLC who had negotiated the release of the MV Suez, representatives of the Pakistan navy, including its Chief of Staff, of the Pakistani coast guard, the Maritime Security Agency, as well as representatives from the insurance and shipping industry. Also victims of piracy were given a voice: Captain Wasi of the MV Suez participated as well as representatives of fishermen. The program was complemented through experts from Pakistan’s neighboring countries, including China, India and Bangladesh, faculty of Bahria University’s Institute of Psychology, as well as international experts in counter-piracy from the International Maritime Bureau, Canada, the US and the UK. The conference was conducted in plenary sessions as well as working groups, focusing on the role of industry, legal developments, ransom negotiations, the welfare of seafarers and the impact of piracy on families and communities. The conference provided a well organized and productive environment in which not only different viewpoints on how the humanitarian challenges can be better addressed were exchanged, but also a number of concrete proposals and initiatives were developed. Proposals which were discussed extensively included the following ones:

• The concrete plan was developed that the national insurance industry might be able to provide cover for Pakistani seafarers working under flags of other states, and hence seafarers and their families can be provided with assistance in the case of piracy incidents. Also the potential of the Chinese coverage model, which centers on a compulsory insurance through manning agencies was discussed.
• Proposals were discussed how humanitarian concerns can be integrated in Pakistan’s national legislation.
• A project was developed by which piracy victims could be provided with psychological assistance by staff members of Bahria University.
• Plans were developed on how ransom negotiation can be improved to ensure low ransoms and prevent victims from suffering from violence during the hostage period. Steps in this direction are a further professionalization of the negotiation work of CPLC as well as ideas for negotiation assistance through compulsory insurance.
• The potential for better regional coordination in the North Western Indian Ocean was evaluated. As it was outlined, a regional agreement comparable to the Asian ReCAAP mechanism will be an important step towards managing piracy in the long run. The IMO led Djibouti Process is a decisive initiative in this regard, and might be further developed into a more institutionalized agreement.

These outcomes of the conference highlight that more can be done to cope with the humanitarian challenges of piracy and that counter-piracy policies can be significantly improved in integrating humanitarian concerns. Rightfully the conference results allow for some optimism that the situation of seafarers and fishermen might improve in the near future. While such proposals will not reduce the level of piracy – indeed the cynic might argue that they lead to a further normalization and institutionalization of piracy – they are important steps in assisting the main victims of piracy and centering the future development of counter-piracy policies on the weakest, the seafarers, fishermen and their families.

The Karachi conference documents well how important it is that countries affected by piracy develop national forums in which stakeholders come together, build trust and confidence among each other, and work towards implementing better policies. The conference in this sense provides a role model, or best practice, for how other countries may want to develop such forums.

In summary, it is two core lessons to be learned from the Karachi conference: Firstly, more can be done to address the humanitarian challenge of piracy. Secondly, national multi-stakeholder forums are crucial devices by which to improve counter-piracy.